"A CHRISTIAN NATION CALLS FOR ITS WANDERING CHILDREN": Life, Liberty, Liberia

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Nations mete death. An array of theoretical and historical studies, from those by Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben to those by Orlando Patterson and Russ Castronovo, locate the juridical and punitive power of the nation-state as the singular force of "legitimate" violence in the modern world. By all of these accounts, nations administer death among their own populations, and social markers of population difference (caste, race, and servitude among them) legitimate the modern nation's violence against its own. In the context of such critical attention to death, this essay attempts to recover a corollary account of national life, a historically particular moment of optimism in the power and promise of the nation. This moment comes in the mid-nineteenth century, when social critics in the US were faced with an unacceptable slave economy in the rural South and an undesirable prospect of racial integration in the urban North. Their optimism took the form of the supposition that nations could be made to mete life, not death, if only their populations were adequately homogenous, unmarked by differences like race. For such thinkers, the solution to the twin problems of antebellum slavery and race prejudice was to proliferate the nation as a form or template for all kinds of social aggregation. Drawing examples from bedfellows as unlikely as Sarah J. Hale and Martin R. Delany, this essay argues that through the 1850s, both thinkers imagine that racial difference provides the basis for national affiliation, so that each race ought to have its own nation.[1] Rather than proposing a strict liberal nationalism, however, both Hale and Delany also suppose that the nation becomes a basis for affiliation through a particular application of Christian teleology. Their thought

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accordingly invites a reconsideration of the degree to which the nation form has been a primarily secular entity in American intellectual history. I argue that by conjoining religion with nation, Hale and Delany contribute, indirectly but surely, to the secularization of social and political life in the nineteenth century.

1

The most familiar moment of integrationist tension in antebellum literature comes at the conclusion of *Uncle Tom's Cabin* (1852), which sees the departure of George and Eliza to Liberia. The novel's efforts to humanize black characters, and to create sympathy for black families on the part of white readers, falter under the specter of the nation.[2] This concluding episode frequently embarrasses modern readers who might wish to promote (for personal, political, or pedagogical reasons) the seemingly integrationist sentiments that characterize the rest of Stowe's text, and many critics are quick to point out that Stowe later thought better of her conclusion and did not end her subsequent antislavery novels in the same way.[3] Although Stowe did reconsider this ending in terms more palatable to latter-day integrationist politics, her 1852 position might best be read as symptomatic of larger concerns circulating in the decade before the Civil War about how, or even whether, a racially integrated US nation could emerge.

In her 1857 preface to Frank J. Webb's *The Garies and Their Friends*, one of the earliest among what are now called African-American novels, Stowe writes that the book engages "a question which the late agitation of the subject of slavery has raised in many thoughtful minds; viz.—Are the race at present held as slaves capable of freedom, self-government and progress?" (Webb xvi). Linking freedom and *self*-government together, this passage adumbrates a non-integrationism reminiscent of Stowe's earlier position on Liberia. Furthermore, the nonintegrationist sentiment in the preface is inconsistent with Webb's vision in the novel, which makes repeated pleas for a more benevolent regard of free blacks by whites, endorsing integrated communities and schools, although not racial passing or intermarriage.[4] Consonant with this tension, *Uncle Tom's Cabin*'s vision of a nonintegrationist Christian universalism, which suggests that people are equal with respect to race but not nation, comes into conflict with latter-day political desires for an integrationist liberal pluralism, which suggests that people are different with respect to race but not nation.

I posit that Stowe's position may look contradictory because twenty-first-century readers often (rightly) assume that liberal

nations can or should accommodate diverse populations. Yet, Stowe's contemporaries, thinkers like Hale and Delany, imagine that the social problems attendant on population diversity can be reconciled through proliferations of the nation form. Stowe seems to touch on such a view when she evokes black *self*-governance in the preface to Webb's novel. Her evocation suggests Liberia, not because it was the only possible outcome of abolition in 1857, but rather because self-governance is what it, as nation, promises. Liberia solves the problem of national integration through the proliferation of the nation form into alternative global territories.

Liberia was established in 1821 as a Christian missionary colony for repatriated blacks by the American Colonization Society (ACS).[5] Prominent ACS members included Francis Scott Key, Elias Caldwell, Chief Clerk of the US Supreme Court, and Henry Clay, Speaker of the House of Representatives. Founded in 1816, the ACS was a private, paragovernmental organization, which, through its prominent Washington connections, could secure some federal funding. The motivation for the founding of Liberia, although variable among individual members, can be summarized into three arguments: the first, and most consistent, was the argument about white racial prejudice. Because prejudice was seen as an intractable problem, continued residence in the US would presumably lead to the continued degradation of blacks, and possibly of whites, through racial "mixture," as Thomas Jefferson famously euphemized (148). The second argument was articulated as the kindness of sending blacks "back" to Africa, both for them and the native Africans they would Christianize. This line of argument was especially popular among religious proponents of Liberian colonization, including northern opponents of slavery like Lyman Beecher.[6] Finally, according to a third argument, Liberia would establish trade relations and thus would help subsidize the costs of the ACS, provide Liberia with industry, and create imports for the US.[7] This economic argument was the least common of the three and was usually articulated as a conciliatory point.

Each of these arguments predated the founding of both Liberia and the ACS, and none of them, before or after 1821, consistently assumed or logically required that universal emancipation and the abolition of slavery would accompany exportation. Liberian immigration concerned free blacks, rather than their enslaved counterparts. Along these lines, John Saillant notes that interest in colonization—on the part of both its white financial backers and its voluntary black emigrants—was waning by 1830 and revived sharply in Virginia after the violent slave insurrection at Southampton led by Nat Turner in August 1831. This revival of pro-Liberian sentiments sparked a counter position among some

prominent northern abolitionists, including William Lloyd Garrison in his *Thoughts on African Colonization* (1832) and Lydia Maria Child in her *Appeal for That Class of Americans Called Africans* (1833). Newly sparked objections to Liberia had crystallized around 1833 to create a firm political linkage between abolition and racial integration which lasted through the Civil War—as did arguments for Liberia and the issues of urban discrimination against free blacks in the North, which motivated many to support Liberia in the first place.[8]

Critics who underplay or excuse the Liberia episode which concludes *Uncle Tom's Cabin* follow a line of thinking inaugurated by Garrison's and Child's texts, where the colonialist enterprise of Liberia serves only as a foil for national integration within the US. This line of thinking misses the fact that Liberia was, significantly in the minds of its supporters, to be a nation, not just a colony. Texts as generically and politically different as Hale's 1853 polemical novel, *Liberia; or, Mr. Peyton's Experiments*, and Delany's 1852 political tract, *The Condition, Elevation, Emigration and Destiny of the Colored People of the United States, Politically Considered*, both frame their arguments about discrimination in the US and emigration abroad in national terms. In order to argue for racial justice, these texts take the nation form for granted. Hale's and Delany's unremarkable visions of the nation are themselves remarkable, as they reveal strong continuities between Hale's conservative aspiration for a Christian civilization in Africa and Delany's radical aspiration for black communities in the Americas.[9]

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Despite the different ends to which Hale and Delany use Liberia (Hale as an ideal, Delany as a foil), each of their texts makes the same three abstract assumptions about national life. The first assumption relates to sociability, or what Frantz Fanon has called national consciousness.[10] In the act of thinking about remapping existing social worlds, Hale and Delany both take the nation form as a paradigm for the social.[11] The second assumption relates to identity. Hale and Delany both imagine that participation in a nation is not a voluntary matter, but is instead tied to a conception of liberty grounded generally in life and specifically in birth. National membership appears as a matter of racial and ancestral origin, a heritable condition, and an identity grounded in vitality, so that national membership appears to be a function of life itself.[12] The third assumption relates to politics. Hale and Delany both assume that the social and identitarian dimensions of the nation necessarily bond to the administrative political function of the state. The nation form, in this theory, organically manifests as a nation-state.

National membership, for both these thinkers, creates conditions for political agency, which may be expressed as democratic representation, political freedom, the execution of natural rights, and popular sovereignty. The conjunction of sociability, identity, and politics is not necessarily specific to the nation form. Other organizational rubrics—e.g. community or culture—can also inhabit the conjunction of those categories, but Hale and Delany see the national version of this conjunction as a mediating factor between human societies and the divine teleology on which those societies are imagined to depend—a teleology also evident in the "progress" that Stowe mentions alongside freedom and self-government in her preface to Webb's novel.

Hale's and Delany's deployment of a religious motif such as teleology in the context of nation-building work demands a reconsideration of the status of the nation, which is otherwise a presumptively secular entity. Many commentators have noted that the standard definition of the secular—as the privation of religion, the opposite of the sacred—makes little sense with respect to US history, which has frequently seen religious concerns articulated with and alongside public national institutions.[13] Instead, the secular is the domain in which religion is subordinate—in which, for example, religious motifs are made to serve political, social, and otherwise worldly ends, rather than vice versa. In this sense, Hale's and Delany's imaginings of Liberia and related national separatist projects serve in this essay as a case study in how the normalization of the nation form advances the secularization of US culture in the nineteenth century.

Secularization, understood in these terms, produces new protocols for scholarly reading. For instance, with such an understanding in place, it is difficult to dismiss Hale's and Delany's religious language as a moral smoke screen through which they really seek to further their nation-building projects. Instead, readers would have to imagine that religion matters to their nationalist in some fundamental way, and perhaps even that religion matters to the rhetorical construction and maintenance of nations in the nineteenth century. The readings that follow develop these protocols, but this development requires some refinement of the use of the term "nation." While numerous studies have considered the ideology of the nation (nationalism) or the sociology of the nation (national identity), I will focus on the power of the nation as an imaginary (the nation form). Although I greatly admire work by Benedict Anderson and Charles Taylor, respectively, on national and social imaginaries, this essay departs from their work to the extent that it is exclusively concerned with the role of fictions which produce social imaginaries that are counter-factual or otherwise historically

unrealized. I use literary texts to excavate presently foreclosed but historically imaginable possibilities.[14] The conclusion of the essay will explain how mid-nineteenth-century imaginings of national non-integration yielded to, and became foreclosed by, a commitment to national union, which will be familiar to many readers. But this essay's primary focus on foreclosure is designed to challenge interpreters of the past to make sense of artifacts that contest conventional understandings of ordinary social processes, even of a process as widely taken for granted as secularization.

2

Teleology prevents the liberal nation from appearing arbitrary in its claims to political legitimacy. When Abraham Lincoln's "Address at Gettsyburg, Pennsylvania" argues that victory for the North proves that "these dead shall not have died in vain" (563) his appeal to teleology reaches toward life's end. Lincoln's words at Gettysburg and his martyrdom soon thereafter bespeak a secular eschatology that becomes a dominant national idiom during and after the Civil War. But in the early 1850s, Hale and Delany, engaged in the political work of imagining the world otherwise than it is, both envision a secular teleology designed not to stave off the arbitrariness of endings, but the arbitrariness of beginnings.

Genealogy inaugurates Hale's *Liberia*. The novel tells the story of Charles Peyton, the only male descendent of a southern family "among the earliest settlers and largest landholders in Virginia" (5). The novel opens at the turn of the nineteenth century, under the fear of a slave insurrection on a neighboring plantation that never materializes. Ill at the time of these rumors, Peyton, along with his wife, sister, and mother, must rely on his slaves for protection and assistance. When the threat passes, he frees his slaves as a reward for their loyalty. The "experiments" of the novel's subtitle refer to the series of social environments that Peyton devises for his freed slaves, including independent farms on tracts of land gifted to them, employment as free people in Philadelphia, emigration to Canada, and finally, missionary work in Liberia. Each experiment is progressively more unsuccessful, until Liberia, where the ex-slaves flourish, work hard, cultivate the untamed land, Christianize the natives, work to end the slave trade, and, perhaps most importantly, live free from the specter of comparison with whites.

The novel promotes a doctrine of works. When Peyton's ex-slaves refuse to work for themselves because "Mas'r Charles,

a nigger can't be any thing but a nigger," "The only resource he had, when reduced to this emergency, was to remind them that in heaven all distinction of race or color is unknown, and that they could hardly attain a state of blessedness in the other world without performing their duty in this" (67). Self-respect is key to Hale's psychology of emancipation, but self-respect must be earned with labor. Through hard work, personal worth and public estimation coincide and advance a form of social recognition that the novel repeatedly calls "respectability." The agency associated with putatively free labor gives blacks the opportunity to earn respectability.

While promoting hard work as the means to achieve respectability, the novel illustrates that racial discrimination in the North prevents that achievement. In particular, Hale's text worries about the psychological effects of this kind of discouragement in a way that latter-day readers may find prescient. For example, Clara and Ben, two of Peyton's former slaves, move to Philadelphia, find employment, and start a family. When Peyton's wife, Virginia, pays Clara a visit at her home, she encounters many middle-class expenses: fine clothes, music lessons, carpets, mirrors, china, and plans to attend a literary society. Virginia, motivated by some combination of class and race prejudice, balks at the "pompous manner" (83) of Clara's friends and the "entire folly" of a black literary society (84). More generously, Virginia worries that these expenses are imprudent. She thinks to herself that Clara, and Philadelphia's free blacks more generally, "were wasting their energies on every pursuit that could gratify their vanity, and losing sight of those means that could alone increase their true respectability" (83–84). She expresses a concern that so-called gratifications of vanity should be secondary to the hard work of "vindicating their right to freedom, and also the capability of their race to appreciate and enjoy that precious boon" (83). Virginia and Clara seem to agree that the achievement of respectability depends on a condition of freedom. They disagree, however, on the nature of freedom. Clara's actions indicate that she thinks she is free, and so can pursue middle-class activities. Virginia, by contrast, thinks that Clara's freedom must be vindicated through on-going meritorious acts. The need for vindication appears only in Virginia's perspective, suggesting that Clara must vindicate her right to freedom for Virginia's benefit, and so, only indirectly for Clara's own. Through this exchange Hale's text demonstrates that from Virginia's perspective (which her name and her spousal affiliation with southern aristocracy would suggest as representative of benevolent whites generally) integration brings freedom into tension with respectability. This tension is caused by Virginia's prejudice,

but its consequences are not obvious at this point. Regardless of Virginia's perspective, Clara may attend her literary society and buy her china, so long as she has the means.

The consequences of Virginia's prejudice obtain when commodities fail to sufficiently buttress the psychology of respectability.[15] The agency afforded to Clara by capital lasts only so long as she has capital. And when, following health problems and a lack of financial prudence, Clara and Ben face extreme poverty, infant mortality, and alcoholism, their middle-class aspirations are crushed. Eventually rescued through the financial support of Peyton and the charity work of the missionary Mr. Lindsay, Ben, in particular, still lacks self-respect. He tells Lindsay:

> I've tried my best, and I ain't any thing but a nigger, and never shall be. I'm just as good and respectable now as when I had twenty dollars a month, and my wife dressed like a lady; and what's the use of it. You talk to me about educating my children; but what's the use of it. You see that black man that went by us just now, and held up his head so high when he saw me standing here. Well, I know'd him very well wonst, when I first came to the city. He was a head waiter then at parties, and is now, I believe; and he had been laying up money all his life. He's worth twenty thousand dollars at least, and what good will it do him or his children? The more they know, the wuss it will be for 'em; for they won't keep company with their own color, and white folks won't associate with them, and thar they are shut up by themselves; and what good do their Brussels carpets and pianny do them, I'd like to know? They may try till they split, and they won't be any thing but just what I am, a nigger that every body despises. (110)

If Clara's capital makes respectable her claim to agency, Ben's poverty teaches him that capital alone cannot make respectability endure. What Ben learns from his poverty is that the weightiness of character—the ability to "[hold] up his head so high"—is diminished for black people by the "white folks" with whom they share a community. Hale demarcates the boundaries of affiliation in psychological terms when she suggests that freedom stands in tension not just with "respectability" but, to the extent respectability is not self-determined by blacks, freedom stands in tension even with self-respect. Ben still sees material expenses and cultural refinements as the evidence of hard work, whereas Virginia, earlier in the novel, thought of them only as evidence of vanity. Ben would invest energy in acquisition and education because he reads these as the indexical signs of respectability, but he learns

that they index a respectability that is only tenuously available to him. The frustration and hopelessness he expresses to Lindsay stems from his sense that prejudice and intractable social stratification diminish those signs of respectability. The psychology of discrimination cancels the agency that the psychology of commodity acquisition creates.

While earlier episodes in the novel, set in North America, pursue the elusive idea of respectability, the word "respectability" does not appear in the final long episode, set in Liberia. Throughout the text, the term refers to something desired or lacking, rather than something present. By exporting blacks to Liberia, Hale never needs to make good on the promise of respectability, because the discourse of respectability transforms into a claim on liberty. Hale cites "a few extracts from an address" written by "the settlers themselves" in 1827:

> The first thing which caused our voluntary removal to this country [i.e. Liberia], and which we still regard with the deepest concern, is *liberty*—liberty in the sober, simple, but complete sense of the word; that liberty of speech, action, and conscience, which distinguishes the free, enfranchised citizens of a free state, and that liberty which was denied to us in America. . . . Forming a community of our own, in the land of our forefathers, having the commerce, soil, and resources of the country at our disposal, we know nothing of that debasing inferiority with which our very color stamped us in America. (174–75)

The formal mechanisms of citizenship work as their own entitlements. Black Liberians no longer require social recognition in the form of respectability from white Americans, because as Liberians they have their own nation. The tension in Philadelphia between freedom and respectability now smooths into a near tautology between political liberty and freedom from slavery. Geography makes the difference, but, for Hale, Africa is not an arbitrary alternative to North America. Rather, as the above passage has it, Africa is "the land of our forefathers." Immigration is really only a return.[16]

Although emigration to Liberia offers blacks the opportunity for accomplishment to follow from hard work, Hale's vision is not one of cultural relativism. As Susan M. Ryan points out, once in Liberia former slaves "lose their rural black English dialect and begin to use grammatically perfect, standard (white, northern) English . . . those once slaves can now speak like Sarah Hale." Ryan concludes that blacks appear "in a sense 'whiter'" in Africa

than they could be in the US (572). Building on this work, Amy Kaplan, in an important argument for placing *Liberia* in the history of mid-century domestic ideology, writes that "freed black characters are represented as recognizably American only at the safe distance of Africa" (596). Taken together, these essays accurately characterize the geopolitical displacements requisite for *Liberia*'s version of equality—a transcendence of racial differences at the moment when geography renders those differences irrelevant.[17] This geographical transplantation to Liberia makes black colonists into citizens of a liberal nation, which advances a particular, aggressively domestic, teleological civilizing mission.

The nation is the vehicle by which human agents secure their teleological destiny. Liberia's ability to enfranchise, in stark contrast to the US's inability to enfranchise the same characters, reveals that birth creates the ties to place that affirm the novel's teleological version of liberty. For example, the ex-slaves of Peyton whom the novel follows most closely in Liberia—Keziah and Polydore—were brought to the US in youth. Africa is not only the land of their forefathers, but also of their birth. Polydore, after a short time in Liberia, reunites with an estranged brother, who is native. Polydore recognizes his brother first, and tries to re-introduce himself. Although at first this knowledge "seemed to produce little effect" on the brother, eventually "he consented to take the land usually allotted to every settler, and they helped him to build a cottage for himself near them" (171). The ability for Peyton's ex-slaves to develop self-respect and acquire commodities, which was so tenuous in the Philadelphia episode, is secure in Liberia to all blacks—both ex-slaves and natives. The extension of these abilities to all Liberians depends precisely on the ties that the novel imagines between the place of birth (Africa) and the form of social and political life (a nation). These ties make possible the civilizing mission that Hale depicts as Christainizing, liberalizing, and developing Africa.

Hale invests so much in Liberia's power to enfranchise that her novel suggests, quite acrobatically, that the nation of Liberia compensates even for its own unrecognized status as a nation. The novel registers with some disappointment the historical fact that, by 1853, Liberia did not have formal recognition from the US, although Great Britain and France were "more ready to welcome the nation that had thus sprung into existence than its own foster-mother" (195). At the same time, the novel seems willfully and benevolently to misrecognize this failure of recognition as a maternal clinging rather than as a paternalistic colonialism. In point of fact, Liberia was ordered to vote on its independence in 1846 (which it resolved in 1847) by the ACS, due to the financial

liabilities that the relatively unprofitable colony was creating for its parent organization. The ACS subsequently transformed from a trade management firm to an emigration agency, which became profitable as it charged US blacks for providing emigration arrangements to Liberia (Staudenraus 240–50). Liberia received official recognition from the US government as an independent nation 15 years later, in 1862. Liberian independence, in the imagination of Hale's text, is substantially more total than the historical record suggests. However, this discrepancy brings into relief Hale's investments in the nation form, which her novel must impose on Liberia in order to represent that country's power and promise for its citizens.[18]

I have so far been arguing that the entitlements and empowerments that Hale's blacks achieve in Liberia derive from Hale's commitment to the nation form. The nation that guarantees liberty, property, and self-respect might appear as a secular alternative to a divinity or a natural religion, which would guarantee these same things. But Hale's text provocatively imagines the conjunction of religion and nation, for example in her description of Liberia as "A Christian nation [that] calls for its wandering children" (174). Hale likewise insists on this conjunction in the 1852 reissue of her first (1827) novel, *Northwood*. The second edition of *Northwood* included new chapters depicting Thanksgiving, which Hale would later convince President Lincoln to make a national holiday, and two new references to Liberia. The final sentences of *Northwood* conclude, breathtakingly, that "Liberia has solved the enigma of ages. The mission of American slavery is to Christianize Africa" (408). Any plausibility to this claim rests on Hale's conviction that slavery's Christian mission works through the nation form. For Hale, the political legitimacy of the nation does not replace the higher authority of religion. Rather, in *Liberia*, the nation form emerges as a mediating middle term between individual agents and divine authority. The road to Africa's teleological civilization is paved with a logic of geopolitical displacement, according to which subjects become citizens only in the land of their birth. Ends justify beginnings, and so what Hale imagines to be Liberia's culmination, as a Christian nation, provides the claim to legitimacy for its origin, which she advocates in the form of the Liberian nation.

3

However conservative Hale's line of argument seems when it imagines that Liberia is underwritten by a Christian civilizing

teleology, her argument is nonetheless arrestingly consistent with Wilson Moses's assessment of politically radical discourse in his classic study of the "golden age" of black nationalism. "Ideological black nationalism," he writes, "has been chained to the concept of 'civilization' and has embraced an evolutionary conception of history" (*Golden Age* 10). Moses's metaphor suggests that black nationalism is slave to a particular horizon of freedom. It is striking that Hale's colonialism would also be chained, not to its own particular assumptions about the possibilities for political freedom, but to the same assumptions as Martin Delany's black nationalism.

Contemporary with Hale's *Liberia*, but in contrast to that text, Delany's *The Condition, Elevation, Emigration and Destiny of the Colored People of the United States, Politically Considered* dismisses the integrity of ACS and of the Republic of Liberia. Arguing that Liberia was devised by tacit supporters of southern slavery and therefore could not be in the interest of American blacks, Delany spends more than half of his 200-page treatise enumerating the contributions of blacks to the US: as soldiers in the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, and the Battle of New Orleans; as farmers, craftsmen, and pioneers; and as educated professionals and literati in all then-major US cities. The other parts of the tract include a series of sometimes contradictory (but always supple) arguments: that blacks in the US are "a nation within a nation" (12, 209); that they are naturally entitled to equal rights which are formally denied; that US blacks cannot be expected to leave the land of their birth; that the denial of equality is intractable in the US; that racial uplift can only happen from within the race and without external assistance; and that migration to another nation (currently existing or not) in South America is the solution to the above-named problems. The question of where to find or forge a black nation preoccupies the last quarter of *The Condition*.

As with Hale's colonization scheme, Delany's nationalism is motivated by a desire to counter race prejudice against free blacks in the North. But his alternative to Liberian emigration is not integration in the US, but the further proliferation of the nation form:[19]

> Being distinguished by complexion, we are still singled out—although having merged in the habits and customs of our oppressors—as a distinct nation of people; as the Poles, Hungarians, Irish, and others, who still retain their native peculiarities, of language, habits, and various other traits. The claims of no people, according to established policy and usage, are respected by any nation, until they are presented in a national capacity. (209–10)

This passage reveals the complexity of Delany's conception of political identity. Blacks are a distinct nation as a result of being "distinguished by complexion." At the same time, their political claims are not respected "until they are presented in a national capacity." As an incitement to identity formation, the nation seems a regrettable effect of prejudice, but as a form of political organization, the nation seems a laudable site of empowerment. Identity and political organization are hinged together by the respect that "any nation" can confer "according to established policy and usage" only on another nation. By Delany's logic, the nation form accommodates a socially constructed racialism at the same time that it creates the possibility for affirmative political distinction.[20] In order to access these affirmative possibilities, US blacks need a nation of their own.

But just any nation will not do. *The Condition*, like other of Delany's writings from the antebellum period, expresses no decided preference either for emigration to a particular existing nation or for a particular existing territory that could be nationalized after immigration—as long as that nation is both on the American continent and not a part of the US.[21] For example, in a short chapter succinctly called "The United States Our Country," Delany writes:

> We are Americans, having birthright citizenship—natural claims upon the country—claims common to all others of our fellow citizens—natural rights, which may, by virtue of unjust laws, be obstructed, but never can be annulled. Upon these do we place ourselves, as immovably fixed as the decrees of the living God. But according to the economy that regulates the policy of nations, upon which rests the basis of justifiable claims to all freemen's rights, it may be necessary to take another view of, and enquire into the political claims of colored men. (48–49)

The "natural claims upon the country," which all Americans have, must be reconciled with "the political claims of colored men." Natural claims are inalienable and "never can be annulled," but nature alone does not justify "freemen's rights." Rather, the natural rights of all Americans refract through the "the economy that regulates the policy of nations" and produce national rights. The effects of prejudice against blacks in the US manifest as the denial of a natural right to national life. Delany's black nation, then, is a second-order effect of being born into a world that discriminates on the basis of color. By Delany's reasoning, blacks need their own nation only because everybody needs a nation in

which to be free, and prejudice in the US creates conditions where that nation is differentially un-free.

In eschewing Liberia for the Americas, and colonization for nationalism, Delany creates an account of belonging to a nation that emphasizes locality, but simultaneously transforms locality into an attribute of vitality.[22] Delany explicitly objects to Liberia because its geographical position is too close to the equator and will promote unhealthiness, because its origin was in the minds of southern slaveholders "to *exterminate* the free colored of the American continent," and because its dependence on the US and the ACS renders Liberia "*not* an independent nation at all; but a poor *miserable mockery*—a *burlesque* on a government" (169).[23] More tellingly, Delany writes that "Neither is it true that the United States is the best country for our improvement. That country is the best, in which our manhood can be best developed; and that is Central and South America, and the West Indies—all belonging to this glorious Continent" (184).[24] Of course, "Central and South America, and the West Indies" does not name a country. But this generous grouping of territory, like Delany's sense that his black nation must appear on "this glorious Continent," is of a piece with his claim for birthright citizenship, based on ties to the land on which a government is necessarily, but secondarily, built. Fourteen years before the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, Delany assumes and asserts that citizenship for all people is not voluntary or chosen, but natural and inalienable, inherent in the relationship between place and person, regardless of race.

Delany's predominant metaphor for vitality is birth, but this metaphor is not unique in his writings. If, as Robert Levine has argued, *The Condition* was written as a response to the nationalist, anti-colonialist positions articulated in 1848–49 by Henry Highland Garnet and Frederick Douglass (rather than to the colonialist position of the end of *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, which finished serialization in 1851 and appeared as a book a few months after *The Condition*), then it is not just their integrationist positions that Delany rejects, but their articulations of the tie between nation and life which justifies those integrationist positions (Levine 67). Garnet's elegant speech, "The Past and the Present Condition and the Destiny of the Colored Race," delivered in Troy, New York, in 1848, employs organic figures to distinguish blacks from Native Americans and whites:

> The Red men of North America are retreating from the approach of the white man. They have fallen like trees on the ground in which they first took root, and on the soil which

> their foliage once shaded. But the Colored race, although they have been transplanted on a foreign land, have clung to and grown with their oppressors, as the wild ivy entwines around the trees of the forest, nor can they be torn thence. (179)

Garnet argues for blacks' continued residence in the US on the basis of their transplantation to North America where they have grown symbiotically with whites. The nationalism of this speech is surprisingly nativist, comparing blacks' endurance of "the white man" to that of the "Red men" in order to suggest that adaptability establishes a more legitimate claim to sovereignty than does indigenaiety.

Similarly nativist is Douglass's short news article "The Destiny of Colored Americans," self-published in the *North Star* on 16 November 1849. Even more clearly than Garnet, Douglass employs the language of birth, saying that "The black man[s']" "footprints yet mark the soil of his birth, and he gives every indication that America will, for ever, remain the home of his posterity" (1: 417). But as justification for why the scene of nativity would be inhabited perpetually, Douglass twice asserts "*We are here*. . .. We repeat, therefore, that *we are here;* and that this is *our* country" (1: 417). Douglass's "here" does indicates a future tie, but explicitly not a historical one:

> The persecuted red man of the forest, the original owner of the soil, has, step by step, retreated from the Atlantic lakes and rivers; escaping, as it were, before the footsteps of the white man, and gradually disappearing from the face of the country. He looks upon the steamboats, the railroads, and canals, cutting his former hunting grounds; and upon the ploughshare, throwing up the bones of his venerable ancestors, and beholds his departing glory—and his heart sickens at the desolation. He spurns the civilization—he hates the race which despoiled him, and unable to measure arms with his superior foe, he dies.
>
> Not so with the black man. More unlike the European in form, feature and color—called to endure greater hardships, injuries and insults than those to which the Indians have been subjected, he yet lives and prospers under every disadvantage. (1: 416–17)

For Douglass, blacks' claims to national belonging depend on their labors—of social cultivation, of endurance to hardship, and of industrial expansion. Sounding much more like Hale than Delany,

Douglass in this passage displays a quiet support of the US's alleged manifest destiny, at the same time that he figures his desire for black integration on the basis of blacks' collective ability to survive and prosper under these conditions. Douglass's passing use of the language of birth is ultimately subordinated to a language of survival.[25]

Delany, in contrast, argues in *The Condition* that "The aboriginee of the continent is more closely allied to us by consanguinity, than to the European . . . therefore, we have even greater claims to this continent on that account, and should unite and make common cause in elevation, with our similarly oppressed brother, the Indian" (173). Delany avoids nativism in favor of a form of heritability—consanguinity with the "aboriginee." While Douglass sticks to the positivist assertion that blacks are in fact "here" and will therefore stay here, Delany argues that blacks may be "here," but they will stay because the land is theirs by heredity, by blood and birth.[26]

As with Hale, Delany's appeals to birth work to legitimate a nation, and they are, in turn, legitimated by teleology. Toward the end of Delany's late 1850s novel *Blake, or, The Huts of America*, the eponymous hero delivers a speech to a black liberation army in Cuba:

> "What say you, brethren, shall we rise against our oppressors and strike for liberty, or will we remain in degradation and bondage, entailing upon unborn millions of our progeny the insufferable miseries which our fathers endured and bequeathed to us?"
>
> "Liberty! Liberty or death!" was the frantic response of every voice.
>
> "Then," concluded he, "freedom is ours!" (287)

For Douglass, being "here" indicates a future tie, but explicitly not a historical one—a relation that Delany unquestionably inverts. According to this passage, political freedom can be inherited by the yet-unborn, just as unfreedom can be inherited by the novel's present generation. Delany's opposition of liberty to death implicitly aligns liberty and life against death and bondage, and so makes freedom the condition for life and life the basis of politics. Although this passage does not originate the rhetorical opposition between liberty and death, the text's deployment of that opposition signals a linkage of political life and the nation form which is crucial to Delany's thought. Where liberty and life stand in opposition to death and bondage, Delany imagines, a nation is sure to emerge. As is well known, the novel avoids representing at its

conclusion the revolution anticipated by the preceding chapters. But when the voices of the crowd declare "Liberty or death!" Blake can conclude, on that basis alone, that "freedom is ours!" The determination to think of national liberty in terms of life itself becomes the sufficient condition for political emancipation. As with Hale's imagining of Liberia, Delany's imagining of Cuba depends on the enfranchising power of the nation to such an extent that the novel's national aspirations suffice as the condition of their own empowerment.[27]

But unlike Hale's Liberians, Delany's black nationals must work hard to create the nation that is naturally theirs. While *The Condition* argues that the nation guarantees agency in the form of natural rights, *Blake* instead argues that the nation form is a right that must be guaranteed through collective agency. Remembering slave life in Mississippi from the vantage of Cuba, Blake recalls:

> "When faith and hope were our only dependence, expecting God to do everything for us, and we nothing for ourselves, now with the same faith and hope and dependence on God we have learned and know what He requires at our hands, and stand ready in obedience to this divine command to do it. Let us then, for God's sake, profit by this knowledge, self-reliance, with faith and dependence on God. What is now before the Council; God has been praised—what comes next?"
>
> "Our policy is the first consideration," replied Placido.
>
> . . .
>
> "'Ethiopia shall yet stretch forth her hands unto God; Princes shall come out of Egypt'; 'Your God shall be my God, and your people my people,' should comprehend our whole policy." (284–85)

A passive dependence on God means that God "[does] everything for us" or else, presumably, nothing gets done. For Blake, the difference between slavery and citizenship is the difference between being passively dependent on God and being actively empowered by God. Citizenship requires "the same faith and hope"—the same doctrine and mode of belief—as slavery, but citizenship produces a different practice. In slavery, the relationship between individuals and God is oriented toward bettering or perpetuating present conditions. On precisely this temporal orientation, the passive dependence of slavery contrasts with the active empowerment of citizenship. In the above dialogue, as praise of God shifts to political policy, we see that policy is not based on perpetuity, or even on precedent, but rather on prophecy. Both of

the biblical passages Blake cites (Psalms 68:31; Ruth 1:16) are animated by the future tense, "shall." The nation may be a site of agential empowerment, but God gives the nation its legitimacy by giving it a teleology. Despite political and rhetorical differences, the collective agency of *Blake* depends on God for the same reason that Hale's Liberia amounts to a revelation of the Providential designs of slavery.

4

With divine authority as their key to national legitimacy, Hale and Delany envision nations that do not seem secular in the conventional sense. Even in the revised sense of the secular that I outlined above—based on the subordination of religion to other ends, rather than the mere absence of religion—their nations still do not seem secular. What disqualifies Hale's and Delany's arguments as secular is their shared if unspoken sense, despite otherwise different positions, that religion and nation are conjoined in such a way that the nation, necessarily, serves divine ends. The period during and after the Civil War witnessed a reversal of this orientation, opening the possibility, under the sign of national union, that religion and nation would be conjoined in such a way that the divine serves national ends. A key figure in the popularization of this secular move is Abraham Lincoln. An understanding of how the rhetoric of the post-Civil War era obscures Hale's and Delany's versions of history, not to mention their commitments to non-integration, requires a recognition of the qualitative difference between their conceptions of telos and that of a more standard Civil War spokesperson, such as Lincoln. Hale and Delany imagine a future time that legitimates—that gives license to alter—present conditions of life, whereas Lincoln, in the Gettysburg Address and elsewhere, imagines deaths that legitimate—that give authority to preserve—present conditions of life.

Even when Lincoln, no longtime fan of integration, contemplates alternatives in his "Address on Colonization to a Committee of Colored Men," delivered at the White House on 14 August 1862, he shows no traces of concern for teleology in Hale's and Delany's sense. In that speech, legitimacy, both of Liberia and of Lincoln's proposed black-run coal mining colony in Central America, is oriented toward the politics of the present. In a tone of regret, Lincoln claims that "without the institution of Slavery and the colored race as a basis, the war could not have an existence" (354). For Lincoln, the tragedy of slavery is the Civil War, but for Hale and Delany, writing a decade earlier, the tragedy of slavery

is slavery. A teleology substantively different from the one implied by Lincoln's account gives legitimacy to their imagined nations, precisely as those nations are attempts to redeem slavery by creating an alternative social order that transcends it. Lincoln knows that one objection to emigration is that blacks "would rather remain within reach of the country of your nativity," but he subordinates this filiopietistic nativity to a nativist conception of race, imaging that only one race can have a claim to a place (354). He goes so far as to question rhetorically his black audience "how much attachment you have toward our race. It does not strike me that you have the greatest reason to love them" (355). As the history of the late nineteenth century demonstrates, this idea of race persists, even after the love has gone. Nonetheless, with eyes toward the future, Hale and Delany seek to fill what Walter Benjamin has called the "homogenous, empty time" of history with a messianic telos, and for them this telos is embodied as a nation whose putatively organic segregation from other nations redeems the very possibilities of nation and life as the reciprocal conditions of political freedom (Benjamin 262).

Both Hale and Delany use the nation form to explore the political possibility of social non-integration, an option that, given how little they otherwise had in common, must have still seemed available in the early 1850s. That option would appear foreclosed a few years later, as the rhetoric of Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, like that of his inaugural addresses, codifies the Civil War as a fight over the difference between separatism and union. Through the course of his political career, Lincoln's commitment was increasingly to union, and integration is relevant to that commitment insofar as it is the version of union that proved inevitable.[28] But Lincoln departs from Hale and Delany when he imagines that the nation is not legitimated by a telos, but itself becomes a telos. For Lincoln, the nation does not mediate the supposed design of Providence; rather, religion mediates the supposed necessity of national union. Lincoln's murder at the precise moment of the war's end, and the martyrdom it subsequently came to figure, significantly advanced this shift, insinuating a national integration depending on death over prior models of a national proliferation depending on birth.[29]

Of course, ties to the nation, before and after the Civil War, are secured through affective and ideological means, as well as both religious and rational language.[30] Lincoln in particular advances the secularization of US culture because his speeches, like Douglass's essays and narratives and much contemporary postcolonial writing, figure emancipation in terms of death, or what Paul Gilroy calls "the principle of negativity" which "has the

upper hand over the pursuit of utopia by rational means" (68).[31] For Gilroy, this negativity is by no means restricted to the structure of nationalism, but is rather part of modernity's project of individual self-emancipation. Conversely, it seems that by moving away from the teleological impulse behind Hale's and Delany's nations—moving away from the legitimating work of religion and not from religion per se—the nation form advances the secularization of US culture in the nineteenth century. The end of the world scales down to the end of a life, and consequently, the promise of national redemption becomes a promise that's very hard to keep.

Notes

1. My thinking about racial affiliation in the mid-nineteenth century has been sharpened by Peter Coviello's *Intimacy in America: Dreams of Affiliation in Antebellum Literature* (2005). But my account differs from Coviello's in that he considers intimate affiliations as an alternative to state authority, whereas I consider them in relation to it, and further, he identifies intimate affiliations in the production of whiteness specifically, whereas in this essay I consider them in the production of race generally.

2. Throughout this essay I use the term "black" rather than "African American" because part of what I seek to demonstrate is the way the geographical inflections of the latter term were the subject of debate. Generally, I mean "black" in the sense used by John Ernest, who argues that "early African-American historians did not recognize a singularity of black identity, though they worked to identify a distinctively black community" (425), and in the sense used by Robert Reid-Pharr, who argues that "during the antebellum period, a community of free black northeastern intellectuals sought to establish the stability of Black American subjectivity by figuring the black body as the necessary antecedent to any intelligible Black American public presence" (5).

3. See for example Robin Wiegman, *American Anatomies: Theorizing Race and Gender* (1995), 200 ff., or Robert S. Levine's introduction to his recent edition of Stowe's *Dred; A Tale of the Great Dismal Swamp* (2000), ix–xxx. The final section of Stowe's 1853 sequel, *A Key to Uncle Tom's Cabin*, makes a sustained argument for the role of Christianity in the abolition of slavery. Although Stowe drops any advocacy for Liberian emigration, her argument here is at once strongly integrationist and strongly imperialist and pro-missionary.

4. On the tension between the abolitionist movement's manifest commitments to political liberty and the more subtle disposition of many of its members to social hierarchy, see George M. Fredrickson, *The Black Image in the White Mind: The Debate on Afro-American Character and Destiny, 1817–1914* (1971), especially Chapter 4, and David Kazanjian, *The Colonizing Trick: National Culture and Imperial Citizenship in Early America* (2003), especially Chapter 2.

5. The best history of the ACS remains P. J. Staudenraus, *The African Colonization Movement, 1816–1865* (1961). See also Katherine Harris, "The United States, Liberia, and Their Foreign Relations to 1847," Diss., Cornell U, 1982.

6. Beecher supported Liberia and the ACS during his life in Boston, then Cincinnati, then back in New England. See Staudenraus, 134, 140, 196, 231.

7. See John Saillant, "The American Enlightenment in Africa: Jefferson's Colonization and Black Virginians' Migration to Liberia, 1776–1840," *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 31.3 (1998): 261–82.

8. In 1858, the African Civilization Society, a black pro-Liberia organization, was launched, with Henry Highland Garnet as its president (Horton and Horton 131). The constitution of the African Civilization Society is reprinted in Howard Brotz, ed., *Negro Social and Political Thought 1850–1920, Representative Texts* (1966), 191–96.

9. I take inspiration here from Susan Gillman's *Blood Talk: American Race Melodrama and the Culture of the Occult* (2003), a study of the political and aesthetic interarticulation of black nationalism and white supremacy at the turn of the twentieth century.

10. See Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth: A Negro Psychoanalyst's Study of the Problems of Racism and Colonialism in the World Today* (1963), trans. Constance Farrington (1966), 119–63.

11. In contemporary scholarship, exemplary instances of the argument that the nation form would be the paradigm for the social appear in the recent work of scholars associated with the Center for Transcultural Studies. For an outline of this position, see Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar, "Toward New Imaginaries: An Introduction," *Public Culture* 14.1 (2002): 1–19, especially 4–5.

12. For an impressive overview of the history and consequences of the vitalist metaphor, to which I am much indebted, see Pheng Cheah, *Spectral Nationality: Passages of Freedom from Kant to Postcolonial Literatures of Liberation* (2003).

13. I say this despite the recent valiant attempt by Susan Jacoby in *Freethinkers: A History of American Secularism* (2004). Her account is ultimately a defense of civil libertarianism and pluralism, virtues which ought to be defended in the present political climate but which cannot be said to have an unchanging history in the US as her work would seem to imply. On the other hand, for an important reading of secularism in American literature, to which I am much indebted, see Michael Warner, "What Like a Bullet Can Undeceive?," *Public Culture* 15.1 (2003): 41–54.

14. The texts under discussion in this essay are *imaginings* of Liberia, often, as will be discussed, in stark contrast to the historical realities of the place. Contemporary first person accounts do exist. See, for example, the debating accounts of William Nesbit, *Four Months In Liberia: or, African Colonization Exposed* (1855), and Samuel Williams, *Four Years in Liberia, A Sketch of the Life of the Rev. Samuel Williams, with Remarks on the Missions, Manners and Customs of the Natives of Western Africa, Together with an Answer to Nesbit's Book* (1857). See also Bell I. Wiley, ed., *Slaves No More: Letters from Liberia, 1833–1869* (1980), and Wilson Jeremiah Moses, ed., *Liberian Dreams: Back-to-Africa Narratives from the 1850s* (1998).

15. For an analysis of how the "right to earn" is tied to self-respect within the logic of American citizenship, see Judith N. Shklar, *American Citizenship: The Quest for Inclusion* (1991).

16. For an amazing reading of the centrality of land and geography to national imaginings in the mid-nineteenth century, see Bethany Schneider, "From Place to Populace: Indian Removal and State-Formation in Antebellum American Literature," Diss., Cornell U, 2003.

17. In a fascinating discussion of contemporary Australian multiculturalism, Elizabeth Povinelli has argued that "in actual social worlds those who consider themselves to be liberal are confronted with instances of intractable social differences that they do not set aside—that they do not feel they can or should set aside. They encounter instances of what they experience as moments of fundamental and uncanny alterity: encounters with differences they consider abhorrent, inhuman, and bestial, or with differences they consider too hauntingly similar to themselves to warrant social entitlements—for example, land claims by indigenous people who dress, act and sound like the suburban neighbors they are" (13). I take inspiration from her suggestion that one could write the history of liberalism as the drama of an uneven commitment to difference.

18. Etsuko Taketani has provocatively argued that because *Liberia* documents the period after Liberia's declaration of independence in 1847, it thereby "questions the US government's informal neocolonial practices and its colonizing strategies, arguing for the recognition of the Republic of Liberia and thus exploring the possibilities of African agency and independence" (498). Few critics have found such subtle critique in Hale's thinking. But the limitation of Taketani's valuable contribution to the scant criticism on *Liberia* is the ease with which she reduplicates Hale's assumption that membership in a liberal state produces a palpable version of "African agency." As I have argued, the nationally-derived agency envisioned in *Liberia* creates liberty at the expense of respectability. These Liberian blacks claim rights and agency that are equal, but separate.

19. Garrison, a proponent of integration, wrote one of the very few positive reviews of *The Condition* in the *Liberator*. Nonetheless, the review noted disappointment at the book's "tone of despondency" and stated a preference for "seeing neither white nor black republics, as such" (qtd in Sterling 149). Oliver Johnson, in the *Pennsylvania Freeman*, unfavorably reviewed *The Condition*, and to this review Delany wrote a nasty rebuttal. Garrison and Frederick Douglass chided Delany for this exchange, but in doing so, according to Victor Ullman, they "misjudged the potency of the emigration consideration among the unhappy free blacks" (149). Delany's popularity was on the rise, both as a spokesperson for blacks unaffiliated with the abolitionist movement, and as a foil for abolitionists.

20. To paraphrase and redirect Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's useful formulation, Delany can be seen as articulating a discourse of responsibility through a language of rights (85).

21. Tunde Adeleke discusses how *The Condition*, and Garrison's review of it, promoted the idea that Delany was a separatist. Adeleke insists, rather, that Delany's separatism was only a response to prejudice (158, 191).

22. Moses writes “Black nationalism differs from most other nationalisms in that its adherents are united neither by a common geography nor by a common language, but by the nebulous concept of racial unity” (*Golden Age* 17). While I am indebted to Moses’s book on several counts, I take issue with this claim—but only as it applies, in his book, to Delany. As this essay argues, for Delany, at least before 1860, common geography is essential to black nationalism.

23. His position on Liberia softens around 1859. See Delany, *Official Report of The Niger Valley Exploring Party* (1861).

24. On Delany’s rhetoric of manhood, see Maurice O. Wallace, “‘Are We Men?’: Prince Hall, Martin Delany, and the Masculine Ideal in Black Freemasonry, 1775–1865,” *American Literary History* 9.3 (1997): 396–424; and Robert Reid-Pharr, 125–27.

25. The same is also true of Douglass’s often reprinted speech at Rochester, New York, on 5 July 1852: “This Fourth of July is *yours* not *mine. You* may *I* must mourn” (2: 189).

26. Native American sovereignty cases serve as the other major example of national proliferation as the solution to national integration in the nineteenth-century US. With reference to the 1832 Supreme Court case *Samuel A. Worcester v. State of Georgia*, Priscilla Wald argues that the “government more than protected but actually conferred putatively natural rights” (39). One can see that it is precisely this version of Federal power that Delany seeks to deny through his appeals to natural rights guaranteed not by the US, but by an alternative nation.

27. In likening *Blake* to the nationalist project of *The Condition*, this reading moves against many current critical approaches to that novel. Over the last fifteen years, *Blake* has been read as a participant in what is variously called a hemispheric, “black Atlantic,” postcolonial, or transnational paradigm. (See for example, Eric J. Sundquist, *To Wake the Nations: Race in the Making of American Literature* [1993]; Paul Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness* [1993]; Timothy Powell, “Postcolonial Theory in an American Context: A Reading of Martin Delany’s *Blake*,” *The Pre-Occupation of Postcolonial Studies*, ed. Fawzia Afzal-Khan and Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks [2000], 347–65; and Jeffory A. Clymer, “Martin Delany’s *Blake* and the Transnational Politics of Property,” *American Literary History* 15.4 [2003]: 709–31.) While each way of characterizing the novel has slightly different aims, each approach shares an objection to reading nineteenth-century fiction within twentieth-century national borders. This objection provides an important caveat for thinking historically about the rise of the nation form. However, such readings, of *Blake* at least, have a tendency to overstate the significance of the transnational and underemphasize the place of the nation form in Delany’s thinking. He does seem interested in bypassing the political and social organization of the US (at least in his antebellum thought) in favor of a transnational flow of goods, ideas, or persons. But his project cannot be abstracted easily into a transnational one, because the ultimate goal of this transnational flow in both *Blake* and *The Condition* is its crystallization into an idealized black national state. To put the matter in somewhat different terms, Delany’s black nation is not, to borrow Benedict Anderson’s famous formulation, an imagined political community, so much as Delany’s black political community is an imagined nation.

28. For an excellent statement of Lincoln's commitment to union, see Allen Grossman, "The Poetics of Union in Whitman and Lincoln: An Inquiry toward the Relationship of Art and Policy," *The American Renaissance Reconsidered: Selected Papers from the English Institute 1982–3*, ed. Walter Benn Michaels and Donald E. Pease (1985), 183–208.

29. See Robert N. Bellah, "Civil Religion in America" (1968), *Beyond Belief: Essays on Religion in a Post-Traditional World* (1991), 168–89. On the iconographic representation of Lincoln's body, see Shirley Samuels, *Facing America: Iconography and the Civil War* (2004), 99–117.

30. The bibliography on affective and ideological ties to the nation is extensive. For three significant accounts, see Lauren Berlant, *The Anatomy of National Fantasy: Hawthorne, Utopia, and Everyday Life* (1991); Sacvan Bercovitch, *The Office of The Scarlet Letter* (1991); and Donald E. Pease, *Visionary Compacts: American Renaissance Writings in Cultural Context* (1987).

31. See also Achille Mbembe, *On the Postcolony* (2001).

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